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Keynote Speech
Judging Judges' Ethics
The 2003 Legal Ethics Conference
Hofstra Law School.
September 14, 2003
Judicial Ethics in the Twenty-First Century: Tracing the Trends
By: Roger J. Miner*
Introduction
As the Twenty-First Century begins, public confidence inthe
judiciary is on the wane. In a poll sponsored by the American Bar
Association, only thirty-two percent of those responding to questions on
this subject said that they were extremely confident or very confident in
judges. 1 During a recent argument of an appeal before a panel of which
I was a member, a distinguished law professor, arguing that the district
judge should have recused, said that the public has not much confidence
'

in judges anyway. We certainly were grateful for his input, which I am
sure greatly advanced his client's cause. But lack of confidence in the
judiciary is surely a serious matter, for the citizenry is well aware that a
properly functioning, impartial, and ethical judiciary is the sine qua non
of a just and democratic society.

' Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
105

It seems clear, however, that at least some of this loss of
confidence derives from factors over which judges have little or no
control. These factors include: inadequate judicial resources; 2
procrastination and ineffectiveness of counsel; the expense of litigation;
restrictions on judicial discretion, such as sentencing guidelines; 3 and
litigants' unrealistic goals as well as their disappointment with the
outcomes of their litigation. It can also be said that some loss of
confidence derives from the failure of judges to fully exercise their
authority when confronted with such matters as inordinate litigation
delays, discovery abuses, repeated adjournment requests and courtroom
misbehavior on the part of lawyers and litigants. And, of course, there is
the loss of confidence that inevitably flows from individual experiences
or media reports of wrong-headed judgments, illogical decisions,
disproportionate or disparate sentences, and secret court proceedings and
settlements. What brings us together for this conference, however, is the
major cause of the loss of public confidence in the American Judiciary
- the failure of judges to comply with established professional norms,
including rules of conduct specifically prescribed. In brief, it is the
unethical conduct of judges, both on and off the bench, that most
concerns the citizenry and is principally responsible for the crisis in
2

confidence that the judiciary faces in these early years of this new
millennium.
The trend toward greater public scrutiny of judicial conduct and
the increasing demand for judicial accountability have their roots in this
crisis of confidence. These trends have given rise to the development of
an ever-expanding industry of public and private institutions and
individuals devoted variously to: analyzing the governing rules;
interpreting the rules and suggesting additions and refinements to them;
opining upon individual cases of alleged judicial misconduct; offering
advisory opinions; issuing reports and studies; and, where authorized to
do so, imposing sanctions upon judges for rules violations. Involved in
this judicial conduct industry, on a full-time or part4ime basis, are law
professors, journalists, lawyers, citizen court-watchers, judges, and the
members and staffs of judicial conduct commissions and boards, and of
various other institutions, including Congress and state legislatures, that
have, or take, an interest in this area. Their work - your work - is
critically important in assuring an accountable, respected and impartial
judiciary.
But there is a downside to this industry, and that is overzealousness
in the performance of its work. Too much public scrutiny, too many
3

rules, too many interpretations of rules, conflicting opinions respecting
specific conduct, picayune concerns, and overregulation impact the
enterprise of judging in a negative way. Ultimately, such excesses can
result in timid judges, who continually seek advisory opinions on ethical
matters, recuse when it is unnecessary to do so and generally look over
their shoulders to see if they are being fitted up by lawyers for some
ethical violation or other. Such activities can be a waste of precious
judicial time.and an unnecessary distraction from the judicial business at
hand, and may even have an untoward effect on the decision-making
process itself. These concerns are magnified by unwarranted threats or
unjustified instigations of disciplinary proceedings. The ultimate
consequence of all these concerns could very well be the undermining of
judicial independence.
Under the heading of picayune concerns, I can only refer to the
listing of advisory opinions under the title "Issues for New Judges" in
the Spring 2003 Judicial Conduct Reporter of the American Judicature
Society Center for Judicial Ethics, a leader in the judicial conduct
industry. 4 These advisory opinions, some apparently given in response
to specific inquires by judges in different parts of the country to various
organizations that respond to such inquiries, opine upon gifts that new
4

judges may receive. They say that it is okay to receive a gavel from a
farmer employer or client, a robe from a bar association, and a reception
from a judge's former law firm. Also in the okay category are clocks
and chairs. Now I ask you, should judges be proposing questions of this
nature? Do judges have such an irrational fear of doing the wrong thing
as to worry enough about these matters to seek an opinion? Is there a
real concern that a judge must recuse from all cases involving any
member of a bar association that presented him with a robe?
There was a time when recusal under these circumstances would be
unthinkable. In 1768, Sir William Blackstone wrote: "[I]t is held that
judges or justices cannot be challenged. For the law will not suppose a
possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to
administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon
that presumption and idea."5 Alas, although there is still no written code
of ethics for English judges, the fallowing rule is now applied in the
courts of England: "The Court must first ascertain all the circumstances
which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased. It
must then ask whether these circumstances would lead a fair-minded and
informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility, or a real
danger, the two being the same, that the tribunal was biased." 6
5

This test, calling for courts to identify the perception of a fairminded and informed observer, is, as will later be discussed, a recurring
theme in recusal cases as well as in other types of cases implicating
judicial conduct. This should not be a surprising thing, for in modernday society, it is perception, rather than reality, that has the greater
importance. The manipulation or "spinning" of perception has become a
specialized occupation. Law firms consult with such specialists in an
effort to advance public understanding and sympathy for their clients'
causes. It is no wonder that a court was recently constrained to rule on
the extension of the attorney-client privilege to a public relations
consultant retained by counsel on the client's behalf. 7 So with the
thought in mind that the overall societal trend is toward the elevation of
perception over reality, I turn to the trends in the rules and norms
governing judicial conduct in six discrete areas: (i) getting to the bench;
(ii) recusal; (iii) courtroom behavior; (iv) off-bench activity; (v) financial
disclosure; and (vi) competence.
I.

Getting to the Bench
Although most bar organizations, editorial writers, and other elite

groups seem to favor appointment over election of judges, the great
majority of Americans seem to prefer the election route for getting to the
6

bench. Seventy-five percent of those polled in an American Bar
Association survey last year said that their confidence is greater in
judges they elect than in judges who are appointed. 8 Nearly the same
proportion saw cause for concern in campaign fundraising for judges,
and almost two-thirds of the representative group polled said that they
would be more trusting of judicial candidates unaffiliated with a political
party. 9 In other words, the public seeks an unrealistic purity in the
election of judges. The public seems to be ahead of the ethical curve on
electioneering by judges. Six in ten of those polled said that they saw no
problem with the expression of views by judicial candidates and had no
fear that such expressions would be indicative of later partiality. 10
The Supreme Court recently brought itself into line with public
thinking on this latter point. In Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 11 which I am sure will be the subject of considerable and
extended discussion at this conference, the Court invalidated the socalled "Announce Clause" that was part of the Minnesota Code of
Judicial Conduct. 12 That Clause, promulgated by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, provided that a candidate for judicial office could not
"announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues." 13
Seeing First Amendment violations at every turn, the Federal Supreme
7

Court observed that the Announce Clause was not narrowly tailored to
serve the interests of impartiality14 and was "woefully underinclusive" to
serve the purpose of "open-mindedness" in the judiciary. 15 In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor famously expressed her distaste
for judicial elections, setting forth a parade of "horribles" that emanate
from trusting the people to choose their judges. 16 Ironically, she herself
was once an elected judge. Justice Scalia's opinion for the five-to-four
majority took special pains to note what it was not deciding, as follows:
"[T]he Minnesota Code contains a so-called 'pledges or promises'
clause, which separately prohibits judicial candidates from making
'pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and
impartial performance of the duties of the office ... - a prohibition that
is not challenged here and on which we express no view." 17
A number of states have adopted a "pledges or promises" clause
similar to the one adopted by Minnesota. 18 Such clauses are based on a
1990 Amendment to the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
designed to prohibit "statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to
come before the court." 19 In the wake of White, there are sure to be First
Amendment challenges to these types of provisions also. In a decision
8

issued just a few days after the Minnesota case was handed down, the
New York Court of Appeals held that the campaign phrase "law and
order candidate" was not a violation of the pledges or promises
provision of the New York Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. 20 On the
other side of the coin, the Florida Supreme Court has found an ethics
violation in the campaign literature of a candidate who claimed the
universal endorsement of police officers, referred to criminal defendants
as "thugs" and "punks," and said that she would be supportive of
victims. 21
Since the extent of permissible regulation of judicial election
campaign speech remains an open question, it is certain that the canons
of judicial ethics in this area will be tested as never before. Court
challenges as well as proposals for rules changes are already in
progress. 22 There are those who say that only voluntary pledges to
comply with certain standards of campaign conduct will be
permissible. 23 However this all plays out, it now will be extremely
difficult for judicial candidates to win election if they refuse to announce
their positions on the issues of the day. They will be under intense
pressure by the media and by special interest groups to respond to
specific questions, and they cannot now use judicial ethics codes as an
9

excuse to remain silent. Minnesota v. White will also increase pressure
upon those who seek judicial office through appointment to state their
views on subjects that previously were considered taboo. Confirmation
hearings for judicial nominees in the federal system already are taking
on a different aspect as United States Senators insist on the disclosure of
views on a variety of subjeGts and test the "ideology" of the nominees. 24
And although a majority of the population may see a significant
difference between the announcement rule and the pledges and promises
rule, a substantial minority in the poll previously mentioned perceived
that a judicial candidate who announces his or her views will be

~·

committed to those views after taking the bench.
The financing of judicial elections has also become a topic of great
interest. As previously noted, the public is rightly concerned about
judicial fundraising. In recent years, interest groups have expended
considerable money in pressing for the election of judicial candidates
they think will favor them from the bench. 25 Although the public desire
is for restrictions on campaign spending by all who run for office, but
especially by judges, issues of constitutional magnitude present
themselves in this regard. A growing trend seems to be in the direction
of public financing for judicial campaigns. North Carolina recently
10

adopted a Judicial Campaign Reform Act. It provides for nonpartisan
"""'

judicial elections and also for funding for Appellate and Supreme Court
candidates. 26 Consideration of public funding is also said to be under
way in six other states. 27 The public perception is that judges who raise
millions of dollars to get elected to the bench cannot be fair and
impartial when it comes to the interests of their major contributors. The
required isolation of judges from the identities of their contributors is not
always secured.
A disturbing phenomenon in recent times has been the expenditure
of funds to influence the appointive process. These funds, usually raised
by special interest groups, are spent on advertisements or mailings to
those involved in the appointment or confirmation of judges in order to
exert influence for or against appointments. 28 The trend of judicial rules
of conduct in this area is difficult to predict, but it would seem to be a
good rule for candidates for appointment to steer clear of any association
with the interest groups that provide that type of financing. First
Amendment concerns are implicated here also, and the extent of any
regulation of this type of conduct is problematic.
The participation of judges in elections that are not really elections
at all presents another question involving the ethics of getting to the
11

bench or remaining there. The situation occurs, for example, when one
1.

political party is so dominant that it cannot be said that there are
contested elections. The party nominee is often chosen by political
leaders for political reasons, including ethnic balancing. In New York
City, where there is an ongoing grand jury investigation into judicial
corruption, allegations of payoffs to political organizations and party
leaders for judicial nominations, which are tantamount to election, have
surfaced. 29 Even where direct payoffs are not suspected, political
contributions by judges and their families have given the public a
significant negative impression. 30
In Minnesota, another method has been developed to stymie a true

electoral process. There, it has become the practice for judges to step
down shortly before the end of their elective terms, thereby enabling
gubernatorial appointments of new judges who then run as incumbents. 31
The appointment process has become so common that 91 percent of 297
current trial and appellate judges were initially appointed, and some
courts have even gone decades without an open seat to be filled initially
by the voters. 32 As information of this type comes to the attention of the
public, the trend in judicial conduct rules will be to require judges and
judicial candidates to take whatever steps are necessary to assure their
12

participation only in fair and open judicial elections. The goal, of
course, is the installation of qualified and competent judges, free of any
taint that may occur by judicial elections that are merely illusory.
An interesting way to make sure that judges remain in office for
their entire terms is found in the Wisconsin Constitution, as interpreted
by that state's Supreme Court. That court has concluded that the
Constitution prohibits judges from holding any other public office
during the terms for which they were elected to the bench, even if they
step down from the bench before their elected terms are over. 33 Thus,
the will of the people to elect judges is not thwarted by judges.
II.

Recusal
Nowhere is a standard for judicial conduct so dependent upon

public perception as in the rules governing recusal. Henri de Bracton, in
his thirteenth-century treatise, "The Laws and Customs of England,"
opined: "[T]here is only one reason to recuse - suspicion, which arises
from many causes." 34 Some of the "many causes" for suspicion referred
to by Bracton are now set forth in various statutes and rules governing
judicial conduct. 35 Yet, it is not the lawyer or the judge whose suspicion
is the standard, according to modern day British law and custom.36 It is
the judge in England, as well as in the United States, who must measure
13

the suspicion of the reasonable man to determine whether to recuse. In
,,

present day litigation in this country, lawyers often battle fiercely for
tactical purposes to get judges as well as each other recused from cases.
In many situations of this nature, recusal either has no basis or makes no
sense, and much judicial time is occupied with the issue for naught.
Despite the present practice of Supreme Court Justices in recusing
without providing an explanation,37 the great Chief Justice, John
Marshall, recused in an 1804 case and gave an explanation: He said that
he had "formed a decided opinion on the principal question, while his
interest was concemed."38 Today, recusal in the federal court system is
governed by statute, and the rules of recusal in state courts generally are
similar to the federal statutory provisions. Disqualification, which I use
interchangeably with recusal, is required of a federal judge who knows
that her or his spouse "has a financial interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding." 39
Financial interest is defined to mean any ownership of a legal or
equitable interest, no matter how small. 40 And so it has become that a
judge who owns one one-thousandth of one percent of a publicly traded
company that is a party must recuse. Now, recusal seems to be required
14

in the case of any parent or subsidiary company of a party. 41 A
"substantial holdings" rule would make more sense, but those who make
the rules are too much concerned about the "suspicion" referred to by
Bracton to allow such a rule. I think that the suspicion of the laity is not
as great as the rulemakers think it is.
The rules governing recusal often list a number of specific
situations and relationships that call for disqualification. 42 Also
contained in most rulebooks is a provision similar to the federal recusal
statute that requires "that any ... judge ... of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned." 43 This type of provision raises several
questions: What circumstances should give rise to a question of
impartiality? When is it reasonable to question impartiality? What tests
should be applied? One can only refer to prior cases and advisory
opinions to formulate an answer to these questions. The Supreme Court
has said that an objective test should be applied, but was not clear, as
usual, as to how this was to be done. 44 I once practiced before a county
judge who recused in a case because one of the witnesses was a man
who pumped gas for him at a local gas station. That, of course, was in
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the day when they actually had people who pumped gas. This was the
fear of perception run amok.
The Court also has noted that a judge's "lack of knowledge of a
disqualifying circumstance may bear on the question of remedy, but it
does not eliminate the risk that 'his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned' by other persons." 45 Is there any wonder why judges have
tended to be such "scaredy-cats" when it comes to recusal? Appearance
concerns have also been raised in cases where judges have held small
financial interests in companies that have been victims of crime.46
In one case, a mail fraud sentence was vacated by an appellate
court because the trial judge held some shares in a bank that had
announced its intention to merge with the victim bank. 47 In another case,
a defendant in a criminal case accused of looting a bank president's
estate, sought recusal of a district judge who was acquainted with the
deceased victim. The appellate court observed that there were less than
a dozen personal contacts between the judge and the bank president, and
that there was one letter from the judge to the bank president thanking
him for supporting his nomination and appointment to the federal
bench. 48 Fortunately, the appellate court determined in that case that
recusal was not necessary. 49
16

Recently, the entire bench of a state supreme court recused and was
replaced by judges from the state's court of appeals in connection with a
petition by a member of the state supreme court. 50 The petition
apparently was filed by the member to secure a writ of prohibition to
prevent a court of appeals judge from pursuing a judicial ethics
complaint against her for, of all things, misrepresentations made in
campaign literature. Why the court did not invoke the Rule of
Necessity, once invoked by the U.S. Supreme Court to avoid recusal
involving judicial compensation, 51 is a mystery. By invoking the Rule of
Necessity, the judges of the state supreme court, excepting only the
petitioning judge, could have served. Only last month, an ethics
complaint was filed against a judge who struck down a national rule
prohibiting road building in wilderness areas, the complaint being based
on the judge's extensive interest in the oil and gas industry. 52 As the
judge pointed out, none of the companies included in his financial
holdings was a party to the lawsuit. 53 Here, too, was presented an
appearance question, and perhaps the response was somewhat overdone.
The rules governing judicial conduct that include specific
situations in which recusal is required are clear enough, but there is a
large, gray area presented by the "appearance of evil rule." This has
17

provided great grist for the mills of the judicial conduct industry, and
lawyers and professors can debate at length questions about when a
reasonable person might, could, or would question a judge's
impartiality. 54 Questions pertaining to disqualification based on prior
positions, commitments, relationships, and comments will continue to be
explored on a case-by-case basis. 55 Inconsistency in responses to
questions such as whether and when a judge must recuse when the
judge's former attorney appears in a case will no doubt continue as
well. 56
I make one personal comment on recusal trends. There seems to be
a trend to recuse law clerks or even their judges in cases involving law
firms with which the clerks have interviewed for post-clerkship
positions.57 There is even a stronger move for recusal where the clerk
has been offered or has accepted a post-clerkship position. I think that
recusal is insulting to the judge and arises from an overblown perception
of the importance of law clerks. 58 Although clerks are very valuable to
judges, they provide assistance only and are not involved in the actual
decision-making. Recusal rules for them only serve to reinforce the
erroneous perception.
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Finally, it appears that the presumption against recusal that came
with the notion of duty to sit has been replaced by the "err on the side of
caution" rule that counsels recusal in an arguable situation. 59 I do not
think that this trend is a desirable one, for it will lead inevitably to a
presumption in favor of recusal, with a concomitant burden upon the
judge to rebut the presumption.
III.

Courtroom Behavior
When it comes to judicial behavior in the courtroom, the television

icon Judge Judy is a prime example of the rude, sarcastic, arrogant,
intemperate, inconsiderate, short-tempered, and downright nasty judge.
Although she acts in the capacity of a small claims judge or referee who
deals only with litigants directly in what is essentially a staged setting,
millions applaud her direct way of getting things done. 60 Her popularity
is a paradox, because each member of her television audience would
expect much better courtroom behavior from a judge presiding over a
case in which he or she was a party. Indeed, the trend has been for
disciplinary bodies in appellate courts to identify, criticize, and take
appropriate action in cases of inappropriate courtroom behavior.
Intemperate remarks by appellate judges themselves have been subject to
notice and appropriate sanction. 61
19

Here, too, care must be taken lest the judicial conduct industry get
involved in the micro-management of courtroom behavior. It is only
extreme behavior that should be targeted. When a judge simply rules
against or criticizes counsel, there is no basis for the disqualification
motion that lawyers often make. A judge is entitled to question
witnesses "to clarify both legal and factual issues and thus minimize
possible confusion in the jurors' minds." 62 The Federal Rules of
Evidence specifically provide that "[t]he court may interrogate
witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party."63 The familiar rule is
that a judge "need not sit like a 'bump on a log' throughout the trial"
and, in a jury trial, must accept the "active responsibility to insure that
the issues are clearly presented to the jury." 64
There is a downside for litigants even where judges are acting
within the bounds of propriety. My father once said to a judge who was
examining one of his witnesses: "I don't mind if you question my
witness, but don't lose the case for me." Only questions that imply the
judge's view of the merits areprohibited. 65 Such questions unfairly
impose the judge's views upon the jury, especially where they cast doubt
on the credibility of a witness. Without a showing of extra-judicial
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antagonism, however, judicial rulings alone cannot form the basis for a
claim of partiality or bias on the part of the judge. 66
On the criminal side, a judge who opines at sentencing that a
defendant is a "menace to society" and concludes that an extended term
of imprisonment is warranted by reason of a life devoted to crime, is not
disqualified from presiding over a later retrial. 67 However, a judge who
spoke at length at a proceeding following a jury verdict of guilty in a
murder case, accusing the defense of scurrilous allegations, praising the
work of the police, and promising to "restore the reputations of those
accused of misconduct by the defense," was admonished by a judicial
conduct commission. 68 Appellate judges recognize over-the-top
courtroom conduct when they see it, and have vacated or remanded
judgments in cases where there have occurred such examples of
unfairness as extensive cross-examination of a witness by a judge,
indicating disbelief in his testimony; 69 comments indicating to the jury a
fixed and unfavorable opinion of defendants and their counsel; 70 and
extensive interruption of an opening statement, and frequent suggestions
that counsel object to witnesses' testimony. 71 In one such case, the
appellate court was constrained to remark that "[t]he comments of the
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judge as they appear in the record often would have been questionable
even coming from a prosecuting attomey." 72
The trend is to call judges strictly into account for intemperate
conduct in the courtroom. It is clear that cursing in the courtroom,
disrespectful conduct toward litigants, threats of punishment beyond the
power of a judge to impose, and the bullying of counsel are meeting with
zero tolerance. 73 This is all to the good.
Ethical questions for judges are continuing to arise as the result of
the burgeoning volume of pro se litigation. The courtroom behavior of
judges toward pro se litigants presents a special dilemma where the
opposing party is represented by counsel. Although a judge is always
barred from acting as an attorney for a pro se litigant, there may be some
duty to level the playing field to avoid a miscarriage of justice at trial. 74
There are great risks to the appearance of justice when a judge assists a
pro se litigant to make a case. Opposing counsel and the opposing party
may think that the judge is showing undue preference. On the other
hand, the pro se party will be angered if he loses his case and may think
the judge "threw him in." Boundaries certainly should be established for
judicial participation, for judges need to be able to point to fixed rules to
get them off the hook that impales them in pro se litigation cases.
22

Affirmative obligations already have been imposed upon administrative
law judges in the social security and immigration contexts to fully
develop the administrative record where parties are unrepresented by
counsel. 75 Can the imposition of such obligations upon courts be far
behind?
In recent years, there has been a trend not only to assist but to
encourage pro se litigation. As a result, the volume of pro se litigation
has been increasing in the courts of the nation. 76 Some courts have
established booths in the courthouse where pro se litigants can come for
assistance in starting their lawsuits, and others provide assistance all
along the line as the suit progresses. 77 The American Judicature Society,
which describes itself as the "leading national resource on pro se
litigation," has generated several publications analyzing methods for
helping pro se litigants.78 Whether undertaken by court clerks and
administrative personnel or judges themselves, the practice of law by a
court in this manner undermines the traditional notion of an adversarial
system that includes an impartial interlocutor as an essential component.
Moreover, a pro se litigant whose case is dismissed after she follows the
course set by the court will have a skewed view of the judicial process.
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The great majority of pro se litigants are pro se because they are
poor and cannot afford lawyers. 79 My own solution to stem the rising
tide of pro se litigation is to require lawyers to represent these indigent
people without charge. There are a great many lawyers practicing today,
and each one could yield some of his or her time to assist a few indigent
clients in simple cases each year. This suggestions harks back to an
earlier day, when I, and others like me, were ordered by the courts or
asked by the bar association to represent indigents in criminal or civil
cases without charge. I was told that this was an obligation that went
with admission to the bar. The concept that this is involuntary servitude
in violation of the Constitution is pure hogwash. 80 The representation of
pro se litigants without charge is an ethical obligation and should be a
legal requirement for lawyers to fulfill. Otherwise, the judicial ethical
dilemma will continue as pro se litigation grows ever more voluminous,
with litigants looking to courts for guidance rather than impartiality.
A majority of the cases resulting in the removal of judges from the
bench during the last decade has involved conduct related to the exercise
of judicial power. 81 Other than misconduct in the courtroom, these cases
have concerned such matters as wrongful issuance of arrest warrants,
failure to remit court funds, neglect of administrative duties, abuse of the
24

contempt power, refusal to set appeals bonds, ex parte communications,
improper issuance of a temporary restraining order, and dismissal of
criminal charges in willful disregard of the law and without notice to
prosecutors. 82 There are also the cases of the outright abuse of judicial
power through criminal conduct such as sexual harassment, theft,
acceptance of bribes, and the like. 83 But whether criminal or not, the
abuse of judicial power is judicial misconduct of the most evil kind, for
it undermines the very foundations of the judicial system. As in the past,
misconduct in the performance of a judge's duties, or in the exercise of
his or her powers, will justly bring forth the greatest condemnation and
sanctions.
IV.

Off-Bench Activity
Although off-bench misconduct has not given rise to as many

disciplinary proceedings and sanctions as has misconduct in the
courtroom and in the exercise of judicial power, 84 it has become an area
of increasing concern. Certain trends are apparent in the approaches to
such off-bench conduct as discussion of specific cases, maintenance of
memberships in various organizations, participation in social and
charitable activities, acceptance of trips to educational seminars funded

25

by private interest groups, and involvement in the political activities of a
non-judicial spouse.
With regard to comments by judges about specific cases, the Code
of Conduct for United States Judges is typical. It simply proscribes
"public comment on the merits of a pending or impending action" except
where made in the course of official duties, to explain court procedures
or as a scholarly presentation made for purposes of legal education. 85
The 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct is slightly different, as
it prohibits public comment on a proceeding pending or impending "in
any court" where the comment "might reasonably be expected to affect
its outcome or impair its fairness." 86 A First Amendment challenge to
the public comment provision of the New Jersey Canons of Judicial
Ethics was rejected in the case of a judge who acted as a television
commentator on various high-profile cases. 87 The pertinent New Jersey
Canon had incorporated the "any court" provision of the ABA Model
Code.
The principal thrust of public comment canons has been against
comments by judges in cases pending before them. In a celebrated case
of two years ago, because the trial judge had granted secret interviews to
the press during the course of the trial, the interviews having been
26

granted on condition that they would not be released until final judgment
had been entered, the appellate court remanded for retrial before a
different judge altogether. 88 The rule against public comment on
impending cases has been somewhat more difficult to apply, since it
deals with expectations. The belief that a case may be filed is sufficient
to trigger the rule. 89 Comment on the great public issues of the day
would seem to be enjoined, because many such issues invariably end up
in the courtroom after they have been mashed up by the executive and
legislative branches of government.
In any event, unless First Amendment jurisprudence eventually
dictates otherwise, the rule that squelches all judicial comment on
pending cases will continue to be enforced. Here again, the basis for the
rule is the need to guard against the public perception of impartiality and
bias. But questions needing resolution will arise over what is
impending, what is encompassed by the exception allowing for
explanation of courtroom procedures, and what comment is allowed for
judges through teaching and scholarly writing. 90 I would hope that I am
not in violation when I lecture my law students about the wrong-headed
Supreme Court reversals of my decisions. Courts and disciplinary
authorities will continue to have little difficulty in dealing with judges
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who have used the media to publicly criticize appellate court decisions
that have remanded their judgments for further proceedings, to respond
to criticism in a pending case or to comment on a case pending before
another judge.
Most codes of judicial conduct, including the Code of Conduct for
Federal Judges, follow the ABA Model Code provision prohibiting
"membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination
on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin. " 91 Several states
have added sexual orientation to the list of invidious discrimination
bases. 92 One of those states, California, has exempted non-profit youth
organizations from the list. As a result of that exemption, judges there
may participate in the Boy Scouts, which discriminates against
homosexuals. 93
Recently, the California Supreme Court declined to withdraw the
exemption, but added a commentary to the Code as follows: "[A] judge
should disclose to the parties his or her membership in an organization,
in any proceeding in which the judge believes the parties or their lawyers
might consider this membership relevant to the question of
disqualification, even if the judge concludes there is no actual basis for
disqualification." 94 As noted by some commentators, this is a
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problematic provision, for it permits applications to disqualify even
when membership in a specific organization is permitted. 95 The
rationale is stated in the first sentence of the added commentary:
"[M]embership in certain organizations may have the potential to give
an appearance of partiality, although membership in the organization
generally may not be barred." 96

The trend has been to tweak these

"invidious discrimination" provisions in an effort to avoid constitutional
problems. For example, the new Code of Judicial Conduct promulgated
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court includes the following:
"As long as membership does not violate any other provision of this
Code, nothing in this Section bars membership in any official United
States military organization, in any religious organization, or in any
organization that is in fact and effect an intimate, purely private
organization."97 This type of specificity should be helpful, because, as
the ABA commentary points out, the question of invidious
discrimination is a complex one, and "depends on how the organization
selects members and other relevant factors, such as that the organization
is dedicated to the preservation of religious, ethnic or cultural values of a
legitimate common interest to its members, or that it is in fact and effect
an intimate, purely private organization whose membership limitations
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could not be constitutionally prohibited."98 Fortunately, Cynthia Gray
and the American Judicature Society have provided an excellent paper
summarizing and analyzing the various invidious discrimination
canons. 99 The trend toward specificity has been greatly assisted by this
paper, which is very useful as a guide for judges.
As to the participation of judges in social and charitable events, the
trend has been toward rather strict enforcement of the rule against
participation in fundraising events, even though conducted by and for
worthy charities. The reason for the prohibition is clear: The prestige of
the judicial office may not be used for the solicitation of funds or for
other fundraising activities. 100 This is not to say that judges cannot be
involved in charitable organizations. Judges are permitted to participate
in educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organizations not
conducted for profit. 101 Judges must take care, however, to avoid
involvement with organizations that are frequent litigants. 102
In regard to fundraising, it is of course a matter of great concern
that those solicited may feel compelled to contribute or hold the
expectation that they may somehow benefit from contributing to a
charity in which the judge is interested. However, as an author has
noted: "[I]t is certainly accurate to say that lawyers or court personnel
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can be intimidated into contribution by the solicitation of sitting judges,
[but] it seems less likely that average citizens would feel equally
compelled, particularly where the format of the solicitation is relatively
anonymous." 103 The rule nevertheless is strictly enforced. A judge of
my acquaintance was censured some years ago for participating in a "jail
or bail" charitable fund-raiser, even though he did not personally solicit
funds. 104 Any advertised appearance of a judge at a fundraising event
violates the rule, as does the imprint of a judge's name and judicial title
on a fundraising solicitation letter. 105
As to social events, judges have been allowed to accept ordinary
social hospitality but are constrained to avoid events that carry the
appearance of partiality .106 The Canons of Ethics encourage judges to
participate in the activities of bar associations and other groups
dedicated to the improvement of justice, and the judge and spouse may
attend bar functions such as dinners and retreats as guests of bar
groups. 107 The trend has been to encourage judges, within ethical
constraints, to speak, write, lecture, and teach about the law and the legal
system. 108 I have long held the view that judges have a positive duty to
educate and that the duty extends to the education of law students as
well as of the practicing bar. Judges in the federal system may receive
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payment, up to certain limits based on their salaries, for teaching,
although honoraria are disallowed.

109

Many bar associations take positions on matters of social policy.
The American Bar Association has taken a number of positions on social
policy, as has the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, just to
give two examples. The trend is for judges to maintain their
memberships in such associations, but to avoid participation in the
development of controversial public policy positions and to avoid voting
upon them as well. 110 Some judges apparently feel so uneasy about this
phase of bar association activity that they have resigned from
membership rather than be associated in any way with policies with
which they do not agree or which they feel may be tested in their courts.
A hot issue for federal judges has been the propriety of attendance
at all-expense-paid seminars sponsored by private interest groups. At
least one application for recusal on the basis of a judge's attendance at
such a seminar was rejected. 111 Recently, congressional legislation to
prohibit such attendance has been attached to proposals for pay raises for
federal judges. 112 Despite the support of the Chief Justice and the
Judicial Conference of the United States for such programs, 113 adverse
publicity about the appearance of partiality will tend to hold down
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judicial participation in such privately financed activities. At least that is
the way I see it. It does seem strange, though, that no questions have
been raised about judges who accept all-expense-paid trips from
specialty bar associations, such as the one based in New York City, that
regularly fly judges and their spouses to high-end resorts in such places
as Hawaii and Mexico under cover of participation in brief panel
discussions.
Inevitably, First Amendment challenges to restrictions on the
political activities of sitting judges not campaigning for their own
elections will be mounted in the wake of Minnesota v. White. Just as
inevitably, the rules governing the extent to which a judge may be
involved in the political activities of a spouse will be subject to First
Amendment testing. Present rules generally prohibit judges from any
direct participation in a spouse's political campaign. This includes such
things as soliciting funds, handing out campaign literature, posting signs,
soliciting votes, accompanying the spouse to campaign events, or
driving a car with a spouse's campaign sticker attached. 114
Some of the rules regarding participation in spousal candidacies
are downright silly. For example, it appears that New York prohibits a
judge from contributing to a spouse's political campaign.us There are
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conflicting opinions about whether funds from a joint bank account can
be withdrawn by a judge's spouse to be used for political purposes. 116
Questions have even been raised about a judge's attendance at nonpolitical events with a candidate spouse, whether a judge's photograph
may be included in a campaign brochure, and the permissible uses of a
jointly owned house during a spouse's campaign. 117
While it is true that a spouse's political activities may be perceived
as reflecting the judge's views, care must be taken so as not to impede
the political career of a spouse through the overregulation of a judge.
The rights of a spouse may be affected through the application of rules
of judicial ethics. When I first became a judge, I acquainted my wife
with the then-applicable 1972 ABA Model Code, which provided that a
judge "should encourage members of his [note the archaic "his"] family
to adhere to the same standards of political conduct that apply to him." 118
My wife, a well-known political activist at that time, responded:
"Consider me encouraged," and went on to lead some statewide and
national campaigns. The encouragement to adhere to judicial conduct
rules now applies only in regard to the judge's own political
campaign. 119
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V.

Financial Disclosure
A spouse of a judge may also become involved in issues of judicial

ethics through the requirement that judges file financial disclosure
statements. Such requirements exist in almost every state and in the
federal system. 120 Designed primarily to reveal conflicts of interest, the
financial statements required are often so detailed and the forms for
disclosure so cryptic that many judges retain the services of certified
public accountants to prepare the reports. Indeed, federal judges are
allowed reimbursements of up to $1000 for such fees. 121 In any event, a
federal judge is required to disclose financial information concerning his
or her spouse and dependent children as well as his or her own financial
information. 122 Exempt from disclosure are assets in which the spouse
has a sole financial interest, and (1) which are not derived from the
assets or income of the judge; (2) from which the judge does not derive
or expect any benefit; and (3) of which the judge has no knowledge. 123
Compliance with the last prong of the exemption provision is almost
impossible. A similar rule applies to the reporting of liabilities. 124
Earned income and honoraria received by a spouse must also be
reported. So must gifts to the spouse, including transportation, lodging,
food, and entertainment. These items must be reported in the same
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manner as the judge must report them, except when the spouse receives
such gifts totally independent of the judge. 125
While no substantial changes in the rules pertaining to financial
disclosure are on the horizon, the public perception being that what
judges are up to financially is important to know, at least one
commentator has objected to the federal disclosure rule provision that
judges be notified when an application for a copy of a financial report
has been fulfilled. 126 The objection is grounded in the belief that the
provision tends "to chill public access" in the case of lawyers or litigants
who would prefer to access this information anonymously .127 I see little
validity in this argument and do not know of any lawyer or litigant who
has been "chilled" by this requirement. One thing the notice provision
has demonstrated to me, however, is that access is requested in the most
part by newspapers and other media organizations strictly for gossipy
purposes.
The Judicial Conference of the United States recently addressed
the question of public access to financial disclosure reports by issuing
detailed regulations pertaining to the release of the reports. 128 The
regulations recognize the security concerns that some judges have, and
provide that notice must be given to the judge prior to release. 129 They
~

36

provide that any financial disclosure report that may be publicly
disseminated after release may be redacted "to prevent public disclosure
of personal or sensitive information that could endanger the filer
directly, or indirectly by endangering another, if possessed by a member
of the public hostile to the filer." 130 Reasons for the redaction sought
must be given, and the Committee on Financial Disclosure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States is empowered to decide
questions of redaction after consultation with the Marshal's Service. 131
In these times of heightened security consciousness, state as well as
federal authorities will be confronted with the need to balance the
people's right to know against the need to redact or withhold financial
disclosure inforrnation for the protection of judges from specific and
identifiable threats.
VI.

Competence
Codes of judicial conduct invariably require judges to be

competent. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges is typical. It
states: "A judge should be faithful to and maintain competence in the
law." 132 Competence has various components, including intellectual
capacity, knowledge of the law, good judgment, understanding of the
judicial process and of the role of the judge, and diligence. The
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requirement for judicial diligence is often separately stated in judicial
ethics codes in such phrases as: "A judge should dispose promptly of the
business of the court." 133 If there is any trend in this area, it is in the
direction of greater expectations of judicial competence by a citizenry
that is becoming increasingly knowledgeable about the functioning of
the legal system. This trend will lead to demands for greater efforts to
enforce competence requirements.
Probably the greatest source of frustration for lawyers and litigants
is the failure of judges to deliver decisions in a timely manner. This
frustration is all the greater because of the fear that even a request to
expedite a decision will incur the judge's wrath and produce an
undesirable result. While the heavy workloads of many judges may
cause inevitable delays in the issuance of opinions, it is often necessary
for a judge to prioritize in order for time-sensitive cases to receive early
attention. 134 A few years ago, criminal case overload was so great in one
United States District Court that it was necessary to place a temporary
hold on civil cases until the criminal backlog was reduced. Dilatoriness
and inefficiency, however, can never be countenanced. 135 With respect
to case processing, time standards and reporting requirements have been
established in a number of states, as well as in the federal system. 136 The
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consequences of failure to comply with these standards and requirements
range from peer pressure to suspension. 137 When I first became a Circuit
Judge, there was an ongoing discussion about what to do with a district
judge who was far behind in his work. A senior judge suggested that
some of the district judge's cases be taken away until the backlog was
disposed of. I thought that this was a very curious punishment, but the
senior judge said that he could think of no greater insult. In the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, it is said to
be the custom to withhold opinion-writing assignments from judges who
are not current in their work. 138
Competence requires that judges see to the competence and
diligence of their staffs and those under the judge's administrative
control. 139 It also requires that judges keep abreast of new statutes, new
Supreme Court precedent, and recent developments in the law of the
jurisdiction in which he or she serves. More importantly, competence
requires familiarity with procedural as well as substantive law. Lawyers
seem to be skeptical about the competence of judges in regard to legal
knowledge, and often start their arguments with explanations of basic
law. Apparently, they begin with the assumption that judges know little
or nothing, an assumption probably instilled in them by law professors.
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I once stopped an attorney who started his argument by ticking off the
elements of a contract. I said: "You may proceed to concepts of
intermediate difficulty and assume that we know the basics." On this
point, I am put in mind of the barrister who argued before the Court of
Appeal in London. One of the judges said to the barrister: "I have been
listening to your argument for half an hour and am none the wiser." The
barrister answered: "I am aware of that, your Lordship, but I had hoped
that you would be better informed."
Knowledge of the law and diligence in its application to the facts
of the case are not too much to ask of judges. Judges are sometimes
wrong on the law, but that is why appellate courts exist. However, their
decisions should reflect their personal attention and involvement in the
case, and the decisions should be their own. The question recently has
arisen as to whether a judge's decision is his own in a situation where an
appellate opinion repeated verbatim large chunks of the brief of one of
the parties. 140 As is frequently the case, academic opinion within the
judicial conduct industry is divided on this question. Some see no harm
in the practice; others see it as plagiarism. 141
In my practice days, I considered it a good thing if a judge lifted
some of my language from a brief. Wholesale lifting probably is
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questionable. A colleague on the state court during my state trial judge
days had two rubber stamps - one with the imprint "found" and the
other with the imprint "not found." He would ask for enumerated
findings of fact and conclusions of law from both sides and would use
one stamp or the other in the margin of each item. Appellate courts
generally have disapproved of this practice. 142 Nevertheless, courts
generally have been reluctant to reverse for the verbatim adoption of
prepared findings, especially where the judge has revised them in certain
respects and thereby has demonstrated his or her own input in the
decision. 143
It seems to me that the duty of competence includes the duty to
assist in the selection of those who will serve as competent judges.
Typically, ethics codes allow judges to "participate in the process of
judicial selection by cooperating with appointing authorities and
screening committees seeking names for consideration, and by
responding to official inquiries concerning a person being considered for
ajudgeship." 144 I see this as an affirmative duty, although it is ordinarily
not so framed. Close attention should be paid to the opinions of sitting
judges as to who is competent to join them. Judicial competence is too
important to be left to committees of lawyers alone to determine. In this
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regard I quote from the records of the Constitutional Convention as they
reflect the tongue-in-cheek remarks of Benjamin Franklin during the
debate of the issue of the proper method of judicial selection: "He then
in a brief and entertaining manner related a Scotch mode, in which the
nomination proceeded from the Lawyers, who always selected the ablest
of the profession in order to get rid of him, and share his practice (among
themselves)." 145
Conclusion
I conclude with an observation and a suggestion. My observation
is that judicial malefactors constitute but a very small percentage of the
American Judiciary at any given time. There are more than 30,000 full
and part-time judges in the nation. 146 In the twenty-one-year period
between 1980 and the end of 2001, only about 285 were removed from
office through state disciplinary proceedings. 147 It is true that some
judges during that period resigned, retired, were defeated or did not run
for reelection, or died before complaints against them were resolved; 148
and that disciplinary sanctions other than removal were imposed in a
number of cases. Nonetheless, it was the very rare case in which an
ethical violation was of sufficient magnitude to warrant removal.
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Although one ethical violation is too many, regardless of the
penalty imposed, the ethical condition of the judiciary is not as much in
need of repair as the judicial conduct industry sometimes makes it out to
be. I referred earlier to the possible effects upon judges of the
overzealousness of the industry in the performance of its work. The
same excessive zeal may also affect the citizenry by contributing to an
unwarranted lack of confidence in the judiciary as a whole. The industry
should be attentive to this concern.
My suggestion is for greater transparency in judicial disciplinary
proceedings. Unsurprisingly, the press has been clamoring for this for
some time, 149 and I, for one, think it would be a good thing. So do other
judges. 150 Secrecy is usually not desirable in matters of this kind, and I
believe that open proceedings would go far toward restoring public
confidence in the judiciary. Various reasons have been advanced for
keeping judicial disciplinary proceedings closed. They include: (1)
shielding complainants and witnesses from retribution and harassment;
(2) protecting innocent judges from being wrongly accused; (3)
maintaining confidence in the judicial system by avoiding premature
disclosures of misconduct; (4) encouraging offending judges to resign in
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place of a formal hearing; and (5) insulating Judicial Conduct
Commission members from outside pressures.

151

My rebuttal to these arguments includes the following: (1)
witnesses in these proceedings need no more protection from retaliation
and harassment than they need in any other type of judicial proceeding;
(2) many wrongly accused judges would like it to be known publicly that
the accusations against them are baseless; (3) public confidence in the
system is enhanced when the public can follow the accusation, the
proceedings employed to resolve it, and the ultimate disposition; (4)
offending judges should not be permitted to have the accusations
disposed of merely by resigning; and (5) there is no demonstrable need
to protect carefully-chosen commission members from "outside
pressure." Indeed, it is interesting to note that some judges in closedhearing states have demanded that their hearings be open. 152
According to recent dispatches, 153 the New Yark Judicial Conduct
Commission received 1,435 complaints about judges in the year 2002.
There are nearly 3,500 full and part-time judges in New York. Only
twenty-eight judges received public discipline of any kind. If all of
these complaints had all been made public, it would have been clear to
the citizenry that the vast majority of complaints about judges were
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made by litigants who simply were unhappy with the outcomes of their
cases. It would also have been clear that the vast majority of judges
conform to the highest ethical standards in their judicial service. And it
would have been clear that the judiciary as a whole well deserves the
confidence of the public it serves.
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Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.
Q.

A.
Q.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

What happened then?
He told me, he says, "I have to kill you because
you can identify me."
Did he kill you?
No.
Now I am going to show you what has been marked as
plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 and ask if you recognize
the picture.
John Fletcher.
That's you?
Yes, sir.
And you were present when the picture was taken,
right?
Now, Mrs. Johnson, how was your first marriage
terminated?
By death.
And by whose death was it terminated?
What is your name?
Ernestine McDowell.
And what is your marital status?
Fair.
Are you married?
No, I am divorced.
What did your husband do before you divorced him?
A lot of things that I didn't know about.

Q.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

,-

Mr. Jones, is your appearance this morning pursuant
~o a subpoena which was served upon you?
No. This is how I dress when I go to work.
And lastly, Gary, all your responses must be oral.
Okay? What school do you go to?
Oral.
How old are you?
Oral.

Q.
A.
Q.

Do you have any sort of medical disability?
Legally blind.
Does that create substantial problems with your
eyesight as far as seeing things?

Q.
A.

Are you qualified to give a urine sample?
Yes, I have been since early childhood.

Was there some event,. Valerie, that occurred which
kind of finally made you determined that you had to
separate from your husband? ·
Yes.
· ·
What did he do?
Well, uh, he tried to kill me.
All right. And then you felt that that was the
last straw, is that correct?

Q.
A.

Q.

A.
Q.

As you were driving your car just before the
accident, where was your right foot located?
It was located at the end of my right leg!

Q.

A.

;11!1:=!eds'!'

~.

~~ct~'; <;lid' Aou say he !as s~or !~
~-,
aid h Was shot 111 th- --~'-~?-J~_on.

Q.

Do you recall approximately the time that you
examined the body of Mr. Edgington at the
mortuary?
It was in the evening. The autopsy started
about 8:30 P.M.
And Mr. Edgington was dead at that time, is that
correct?

-•

A.
Q.

stood back and shot Tomm
out his gun and shot

Q.

Do you.know how far pregnant you are right now?

A.

will be three months November 8th.
Apparently then, the date of conception was
August 8th?
Yes.
What were you and your husband doing at that time?

Q.

A.
Q.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

I

What doctor treated you for the injures you sustained
While at work?
or. J (name omitted).
And what kind of physician is Dr. J.?
Well, I'm not sure, but I remember you said he was
a good plaintiff's doctor.
somebody in the gang called "InsanoJf7

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

Is th .....'"-'
Yeah.
Is there
Yeah.
You don't hapnA.....-~
any chanc
o you?
Thei
ristian names?
, like Bill, Charlie, you know Fred?
Perfectly honest, I never knew they was ChrisLrHD

nn~~e things

people acrually said in court, word for word, taken down
ymg c m w 1 e these exchanges.were actually taling place.
£..,/'"Q: What is your date o
A: July fifteenth.
Q: What year?
A: Every year.
11i11 ! 11 I I I I I I I 11+++1 I I I Ii I I 11 ! I I I I I I I I I 11 I :+++++++I I I I I +-+++++++++I Ii 111'

Q: What gear were you in at the moment of the impact?
A: Gucci sweats and Reeboks.
·
;1-+++++·+-++-++-++-++-+r;-,1-+-11-Hi-Hi-Hi-Hi-Hi-Hi-H-H-H-H-H:::!::"-+t++-++++ I I I I I I I I ++++ I I I I I I I

· myasthenia gravis, does it affect your m
at all?
A: Yes.
Q: And in what ways does ·
A: I forget.
orget. Can you give us an example of something that you ve

1

?

I ,I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1. I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I+++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Q: How old is your son, the one living with you?
A: Thirty-eight or thirty· five. I can't remember which.
Q: How Jong has he lived with you?
A: Forty-five years.
++1111 i I 11 I I 11 I I 1111 11 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 11 I 111 I 11 I 11 I I 11 I I+++++++++++++++++

Q: What was the first thing your husband said to you when he woke that morning?
A: He said, "Where am I Cathy?"
Q: And why did that upset you?
A: My name is Susan. .
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I l"l .1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I+ I I I i I I I I I I I I I I I I ! +++

Q: And where was the location of the accident?
A: Approximately milepost 499.
Q: And where is milepost 499?
A: Probably between milepost 498 and 500.
11 I I 11 I I I 11 I I I I I 11111 I I I I I I I I I I I I 11 I 11 I I 11 I I: 1++++++++++++++1 I I I 1+1 I I I I I I

Q: Sir what is your IQ?
A: Well, I can see pretty well.
oni Resort Hotel for the sponsorshi of the h ·
e1

..
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

I understand that you want a new lawyer because your
present lawyer is not interested in your case, is that
right?
Yes, Your Honor.
Counselor, what do you have to say?
Could you repeat that, Your Honor? I wasn't listening.

VOIR DIRE

Q.
A.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Can you participate in an endeavor in which the
ultimate result might be death by lethal injection?
They do that up in Huntsville, don't they?
Yeah, I guess I could do it if it was on the weekend.
Can you tell us that you would follow the c
s
· structions regardless of what el
pened
dur1
the course of the
·
Cognitive
yes.
onally, yes. Emotionally,
effect~v
,
n't know. Or perhaps effectively,
rationally,
Property holder?
Yes, I am, Your Honor.
Married or single?
Married for twenty years, Your Honor.
Formed or express an opinion?
Not in twenty years, Your Honor.

EXPERT WITNESS
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Doctor, what is the meaning of sperm being present?
It indicates intercourse.
Male sperm?
That is the only kind I know.

In a murder trial, the defense attorney was cross-examining a
pathologist. Here's what happened:

tJ

Attofney:

Before you signed the death certificate, had you
taken the pulse?

Cor6zfer:

No.

Attcifney:

Did you listen to the heart?

Cordr!er:

No.

AttrJiney:

Did you check for breathing?

Cor~er:

No .

.:1"

Attotne¥:

A.
Corener1

So, when you signed the death certificate, you
weren't sure the man was dead, were you?
Well, let me put it this way. The man's brain was
sitting in a jar on my desk. But I guess it's
possible he could be out there practicing law somewhere.

1-C 1RsV

~~Testimony from an Expert Witness
l
La1°ffe:r..:

_r{.
Witness-:-

Doct:or, as a result of your examination of the
plaintiff, is the young lady pregnant?
The young lady is pregnant, but not as a
result of my examination.

